In this exclusive interview, Israeli military leader Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, the founder and chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), provides a rare and deeply informed perspective on the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict and the broader geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. Drawing from his extensive experience in Israel’s defense establishment, Amir sheds light on the intelligence failure that contributed to the October 7 attacks, discussing the dangers of cognitive biases and the “Conceptzia” mindset that led many senior officials to underestimate the threat posed by Hamas. He offers key insights on how Israel, and defense communities at large, can restructure their thinking to avoid such pitfalls in the future.
Amir also reflects on the historical and psychological aspects of the conflict, responding to thought-provoking questions on the Palestinian mindset, the denial of defeat, and the role of education in breaking the cycle of violence. He addresses the challenges posed by the pervasive anti-Semitic narratives in Palestinian schools and suggests possible avenues for fostering change, especially in Gaza’s post-war reconstruction efforts.
With a deep understanding of regional dynamics, Amir also discusses Saudi Arabia’s shifting stance toward Israel and its growing ties with Iran, offering an insider’s view on the strategic calculus behind this pivot. In conclusion, he explores the future of U.S.-Israel collaboration in countering terrorist threats across the region, laying out his vision for a more secure and stable Middle East.
Don’t miss this chance to hear from a key figure who has been at the heart of Israel’s defense leadership for decades.
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For those who prefer to read a condensed transcript of the interview, text is provided below the following video.
Jessica: You’ve previously mentioned that the intelligence failure on October 7 was partly due to a fixed mindset within the defense establishment—referred to as the ‘Conceptzia.’ Despite your warnings, many senior officials believed that Hamas no longer posed a significant threat, and filtered contradictory information to fit that belief. Several years ago, during my master’s degree program in security intelligence in the U.S., we studied cognitive biases and blindnesses common among analysts and intelligence communities. So obviously this is not just an issue for Israel, but a broader challenge for all defense establishments.
Drawing from your experience, how can Israel, and other defense communities, restructure their thinking to avoid such cognitive biases and improve decision-making moving forward?
Amir: I think in the Israeli intelligence community there’s a big difference between the amazing intelligence the IDF, Mossad, and Shin Bet are able to gather—especially when it comes to military targets and terrorists. We saw the pagers in Lebanon, and we saw how the IDF can track every missile, know exactly where it is, and target it. Really, it’s incredible.
But when it comes to strategic intelligence, that’s where the serious problems lie. At this stage, we see a tendency to disregard the intelligence when it doesn't fit the narrative they want. For example, the belief that Hamas is deterred and doesn’t want war, no matter how much they’re training or equipping themselves, or how many tunnels they dig. Despite all of that, the IDF and Shin Bet convinced themselves that Hamas was overall deterred and not interested in war. Why? Because it fit what they wanted to believe.
I think one of the things Hamas learned to do is feed the intelligence that Israel wants to hear. They know what Israel seeks, and they play into that. They send messages, even to each other, making it look like they’re not interested in war. They understand the mindset, and they played the game that they weren’t preparing for conflict. This really affected the intelligence community’s analysis.
Meanwhile, in the IDF, my team and I were saying—two years before the war—that war was imminent. We saw it coming. And we didn’t have endless intelligence reports to back it up. Why? It was basic common sense. Sometimes, it’s not enough to just have intelligence. You need common sense too.
Jessica: Right. We think about, for example, what happened with the Yom Kippur War. That was also considered a major intelligence failure. And part of the hot wash, so to speak, after the war included mechanisms for ensuring that something like that failure wouldn't happen again. So, what kind of mechanisms do you think should be put in place in the defense establishment to avoid an intelligence failure like we just had on October 7th?
Amir: One of the key lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was the importance of creating a unit that thinks outside the box and challenges the conventional wisdom of the intelligence community. But over time, the defense establishment dismantled that unit more and more, until it was down to just two or three people—people who had little real impact on the decision-making process. That was a huge mistake.
Another point is about the cabinet, the prime minister, and the ministers—it’s critical that they have the right to make their own independent assessments. They shouldn’t rely solely on the officers in the army when it comes to national-level decisions.
Politicians need to trust their instincts as much as they rely on what the chief of staff or the head of intelligence say. They have access to the same raw materials, the same intelligence assessments, and they should use their own experience and worldview to challenge the army’s perspective.
At the end of the day, it’s their responsibility. They’re the ones who make the decisions—whether to go to war or not. Sometimes, they’ll need to accept the army’s recommendations, and sometimes they won’t.
Jessica: We’ve been talking about this issue on a macro level, but even on a micro level, like as an analyst, if you’re used to seeing something in a certain framework, you are suspectable to similar biases. With that in mind, what advice would you give to an individual analyst who doesn't want to be stuck in that framework—meaning, someone who doesn't want to generate inaccurate analysis that leads to an intelligence failure?
Amir: It’s really important to have people around you who think differently. I always enjoy listening to people who challenge my views. I try to take what they say seriously, analyze it, and ask myself, 'Are they right? Are they offering valuable, relevant information?’
I think the biggest mistake people make is surrounding themselves with others who think exactly like they do. You need to be open to hearing from people who think outside the box and who bring different perspectives.
What we saw in the army was that many of the officers who got promoted were all the same. It became like an army of minions—everyone looked the same, thought the same. No one was challenging anything, no one was thinking creatively. Those who actually tried to think outside the box often found themselves sidelined and not promoted.
This is a huge problem, and it’s not just about the army. It’s about any organization. When it comes to the army or the Shin Bet, it’s especially critical because we’re talking about issues that affect our survival. It’s not a joke. You need people who are always thinking creatively, challenging assumptions, and pushing boundaries. That’s the culture you need in a healthy organization.
By the way, I’m also in favor of using AI. One advantage of machines is that they don’t have biases—they don’t have worldviews. If you feed a machine all the information you have and ask it to give you an outcome, it can offer you an understanding of where things might be headed, without the human biases that can cloud judgment.
I’m not saying we should rely solely on AI, but it’s definitely a useful tool to help us see things from a different angle—just looking at the data itself, without the need to interpret it based on our own assumptions.
Jessica: Former Israeli parliamentarian Einat Wilf once stated that the tragedy of both Palestinians and Israelis lies in the Palestinians’ refusal to accept defeat after repeatedly failing to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state. She compares this to post-World War II Japan, where defeat was eventually embraced to rebuild.
Wilf suggests that, instead of acknowledging their losses, Palestinians have been repeatedly “saved” by external factors, such as UNRWA, allowing them to cling to the belief that they can still ultimately win. This denial of defeat, she contends, has prolonged the conflict.
Drawing from such historical examples, do you believe there is a way in this current war to shift the Palestinian mindset from denial of loss to acceptance in order to break the cycle of conflict?
* To view Einat Wilf speaking publicly on this subject, check out this video.
Amir: The essence of the Palestinian narrative is built around Jewish history. They claim that figures like Moses or Jesus were Palestinian, trying to appropriate Jewish history and reframe it as their own. They’re essentially inventing a nation and a history that never existed. The fact that they’re not building their own story or culture, it creates a huge issue.
Another mistake came when Israel tried to push for an agreement in Oslo [signed in 1993]. It was a poor decision. Israel handed control over to the PLO, a violent Palestinian terrorist organization dedicated to the complete destruction of Israel and the Jewish people. This was a disaster.
Take Gaza, for example. In 1994, the Oslo Accords were implemented in the Palestinian cities of Gaza. At that time, those cities were in the Stone Age—literally. The Palestinian Authority, built on the PLO, took Gaza and, in just seven years, went from nothing to firing rockets. In ten years, they completely lost control over the cities. And this was before the disengagement.
So, any hope for real change in this society has to come from one thing: dismantling the terrorist organizations and working with the local Palestinian leadership—the clans from the different cities.
What’s interesting now is that, looking at the day after, the Israeli government is saying that after this operation, there will be no Hamas, no Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and not even the Palestinian Authority. Gaza will need a completely new concept, one that will likely be based on local clans. The process has to focus on de-radicalization, which is crucial for changing the mindset.
Without changing the education system and the basic ideology, there’s no way forward. If the people continue to be educated to carry out terror attacks and promote a vision of the complete destruction of Israel, then there can be no hope for a different future.
Jessica: So what you’re saying is that de-radicalization is really key to convincing the Palestinian population to accept the Jewish state. When we disengaged From Gaza in 2005, this was an opportunity for the Palestinians to build a state, but it was clear from the actions that came after that their interest was not to build their own state, but to destroy the Jewish state.
Amir: Right. The Palestinians have never recognized the right of the Jewish people to have a state. You won't find one map anywhere in Palestinian society that envisions a two-state solution. It's all Palestine will be free from the river to the sea. In this scenario, the Jews are in the sea; there is no Israel.
Jessica: Just to bring it back to the point I was making earlier—talking about World War II, post-World War II, and Japan. Obviously, we’re talking about a very different culture, but there was still a clear victory and a clear defeat. And I think that’s something that’s still relevant, even when we talk about the American experience.
Since the Vietnam War, we haven’t really seen wars with a clear-cut victory or defeat. So, especially when you're dealing with situations like the Israelis and Palestinians—who are neighbors, mind you—how do you convince them, so to speak, that 'hey, you've lost the war, now it's time for real reconstruction to begin'? It’s a tough challenge.
Amir: Looking at this war overall, even beyond just the Palestinians, we’ve been fighting on seven different fronts. Right now, we have a historic opportunity for total victory. And by total victory, I mean completely dismantling Hamas as both a governmental and military entity, bringing back all the hostages, and creating a situation where there will never again be a terror army in Gaza.
It also means making sure Hezbollah can never rebuild itself. But more than that, it means defeating Iran—destroying their nuclear sites and military capabilities. Hopefully, with the new U.S. administration and American leadership, we can take the lead on this. Israel has set the stage. We’ve already heavily damaged Hamas and Hezbollah, and taken out much of Iran's air defense. Now it’s time to take down the Shia axis, and from there, move towards regional peace.
In relation to the Palestinians, the path to victory starts with neutralizing the Shia axis—making sure Iran can no longer fund, equip, or build terror organizations in Palestinian society. It also means moving toward a broader regional and global peace, building alliances like the Western-Israeli-Sunni alliance. Normalizing relations not just with Saudi Arabia but with the entire Sunni world, including countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Oman. In this scenario, when it comes to the Palestinians, you take away their ability to prevent Israel from making peace agreements with other Arab countries, like we did with the Abraham Accords.
Lastly, we need to apply sovereignty over vast areas in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley, as was planned during Trump’s first administration. If you ask me what constitutes victory, it’s millions of Jews settling the land.
I believe most Israelis want some form of self-governance for the Palestinians in the areas they control. But we don't want solutions that would make Israel vulnerable—like withdrawing from the heart of our land, from the mountains, or from the Jordan Valley.
If we go through this process—if we succeed in de-radicalizing Gaza, if we dismantle the Palestinian Authority, which is like a cancer threatening Israel—we can address a much bigger issue. The delegitimization of Israel, the anti-Semitism we see on campuses, all of this is fueled by the Palestinian Authority. It's a very dangerous organization. We need to work with local leadership, ensuring that they focus on economic development, not on inciting hatred or educating the next generation to conduct terror attacks against Jews.
Jessica: On the topic of maps, I have a friend from Afghanistan who recently started trying to educate herself about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She comes to me and says, 'Jessica, I’ve been learning the basics, but there’s something I’m really confused about. I’ve seen a map of Israel and a map of what Palestinians call Palestine, and it looks like they’re the exact same map. Isn’t that a problem?' I said, 'No sh*t, it’s a problem.'
Look, I lived in Israel for over a decade, traveled all over the country, and spoke to many different people there. Whether it’s on keychains or coffee mugs sold in the Palestinian market to tourists or the pictures framed in Palestinian homes, the map they show is not of Gaza or parts of the West Bank—it’s a map of all of Israel. Always.
And I think that really encapsulates the issue of the propaganda problem. Which brings me to my next question: Given the history of anti-Semitic propaganda and the Palestinian education system, how can we in practical terms encourage Palestinians to move away from this destructive narrative in the aftermath of the current war, particularly when it comes to Gaza’s reconstruction efforts?
Amir: What motivates Palestinians to keep fighting and attacking us isn’t desperation—it’s hope. The hope that they can destroy us. And this is something we need to make absolutely clear: they will never be able to destroy us, and we will never let them have the ability to endanger us again.
This means Israel must have full security control over all of its land, including Gaza. It also means dismantling all the terrorist organizations operating there. As I’ve said, we need to work with local leadership to create something more like city-states, or emirates—essentially, a decentralized structure that fosters prosperity and economic growth, rather than one built on ideology and the desire to destroy us.
We can’t always control their ideology, but we can control their ability to carry it out. That’s why we must maintain full security responsibility across the entire land of Israel, including its borders.
While doing this, we also need to push the de-radicalization process. This involves working with the international community, including the Saudis and Emirates, to bring new programs that can change the reality on the ground.
I believe the day the world—especially the Arab world—normalizes relations with Israel, they will have less incentive to use the Palestinians as a tool to attack us. With peace agreements in place, they won’t need to continue using the Palestinian cause to delegitimize Israel. In fact, Palestinians have long been an asset to those who want to delegitimize Israel, but over time, they’re becoming a liability to the Arab world as well. And this will motivate the Arab world to seek a solution, one that the next administration might push, which will benefit Israel and ensure its security for generations to come.
Jessica: I think what you're pointing out is that there’s a much bigger picture. As long as the Palestinians see that they have support from the Arab world to continue down this path of trying to destroy the Jewish state, it gives them hope.
And you can see it in video interviews, even with Palestinian teenagers. They say things like, 'We love Nasrallah. Nasrallah stood up for us. Hezbollah stood up for us.' So as long as they keep seeing that kind of external support, it becomes an education that’s coming from the outside, not just from their own schools or society.
Amir: Look, the Palestinians, in a way, are like a small grocery store that thinks it's Amazon. Why do they think they're Amazon? Because the whole world seems to be constantly focused on them. It's like they're getting this disproportionate global attention.
They’re not dealing with the massive, complex issues facing other regions like Africa. Instead, they're fixated on a conflict with a group that, frankly, doesn't contribute much. They're not generating significant technologies, they're not resolving broader moral challenges, they're not producing notable writers or publications.
This constant attention gives them this inflated sense of importance. But I believe the moment the international community and Arab countries start shifting their focus to different priorities and stop making this conflict their central narrative, the Palestinians will be forced to connect with a more realistic perspective. They'll need to start considering practical solutions that can actually be implemented on the ground, instead of maintaining this narrative that they could somehow destroy the State of Israel.
Jessica: On the topic of normalization, recently Saudi Arabia became increasingly vocal in its criticism of Israel and support for Iran. With China’s mediation, it appears Saudi Arabia is working to rebuild ties with Iran, marked by joint military exercises and economic cooperation. This shift is a sharp departure from the period of the Abraham Accords in 2020 when Saudi Arabia seemed more open to normalization with Israel.
In terms of threat perception, what do you believe is driving Saudi Arabia’s pivot now toward Iran? In other words, what do you think is happening behind the scenes regarding Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculus, and is there anything Israel can do to influence this shift?
Amir: The Saudis are sending America a very clear message: if the U.S. won't fully commit to supporting them, they might reconsider their alliances and potentially pivot towards the Eastern alliance instead of the Western one. It’s primarily a message directed at the U.S.
Since the Obama administration, the U.S. has been somewhat inconsistent in its position toward Saudi Arabia. This is largely because America is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil, which gives it more flexibility to shift alliances. The U.S. has been somewhat unpredictable - working more closely with the Iranians, then switching back to the Saudis, and so on.
I believe this dynamic will likely change with the next administration. If the U.S. is willing to take a strong stance and effectively address the Iranian threat, it could potentially facilitate a broader Western-Israeli-Sunni alliance. This could open the path to normalizing relations between Israel and the Sunni world, including Saudi Arabia.
The key is American leadership and strength. As long as the U.S. demonstrates a clear, resolute position, the Saudis will likely align with the West, with Israel, and move towards normalization.
Right now, they're making these very public announcements as a strategic message. Behind the scenes, they already have significant discussions with Israel. But ultimately, I think they'll decisively stand with America, Israel, and the Western alliance - contingent on the U.S. showing the necessary strength and commitment in dealing with Iran.
Jessica: What do you believe is the optimal path forward for the U.S. and Israel when it comes to collaboratively addressing terrorist threats in the Middle East? Essentially, what is the broader vision you want to share for the region?
Amir: I see a clear three-step strategic approach. First, we need to address Iran and dismantle the Shia axis. By neutralizing Iran’s influence, we can potentially extract countries like Iraq and Lebanon from Iranian control and reorient them towards a Western alliance. Once we effectively deal with the Iranians, I believe we'll create the conditions for significant regional and global peace agreements.
This vision extends far beyond the immediate region - we're talking about connecting countries from Indonesia to Malaysia, Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. We'll establish new trade routes: from India to the UAE, and then overland to Israel, effectively transforming Israel into the Singapore of the world—a strategic, high-value hub of innovation and connectivity.
The next step involves a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This solution must fundamentally secure Israel’s interests, ensuring Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and critical areas in Judea and Samaria. We’ll create a framework that guarantees Israel's security for generations while also providing a form of self-governance for Palestinians in designated areas, with overriding Israeli security control across the entire land.
I’m confident this can be achieved within the next one or two years. And I consistently emphasize that the more decisive and comprehensive our approach, the more profound the golden age that will follow for Israel and the Jewish people.
We’re standing at a transformative moment. In the aftermath of this strategic vision, we’ll see unprecedented peace agreements, economic prosperity, massive immigration to Israel, and even a baby boom. An incredible future awaits us, but it requires unity, a decisive victory, and the courage to pursue this comprehensive strategy. Once we achieve this, everything will open up, ushering in a remarkable era for Israel and the Jewish people.
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About Jessica Lauren Walton: Jessica is a communications strategist, video producer, and writer in the U.S. defense sector. She has written articles on a range of security and mental health topics and conducted interviews with military leadership, CIA officers, law enforcement, psychologists, filmmakers, and more. Jessica recently completed her memoir about her experience as an American woman struggling with mental illness while trying to get into Israeli intelligence.
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